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International experience and FDI location choices of Chinese firms:  
The moderating effects of home country government support and host 
country institutions  
Abstract  
We examine the extent to which Chinese government support of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
projects and host country institutional environments interact with prior entry experience by Chinese 
firms, and how this interrelationship affects FDI undertaken by Chinese firms. We hypothesize that 
home country government support and well-established host country institutions enhance 
organizational capabilities to take risks in FDI. As such, they reduce the need to accumulate 
experiential knowledge and capabilities relating to entering host countries based on prior entry 
experience in a particular country when undertaking follow-up investment projects. Using a unique, 
hand collected panel dataset of Chinese publicly listed firms during 2002-2009, we find that home 
government support and well developed host country institutions reduce the importance of prior entry 
experience and significantly increase the likelihood of FDI entry into a host country. Further, from our 
sub-sample analyses we identify differences between entering developed and developing host 
countries in terms of the impact of home country government support and quality of host country 
institutions. Our findings help explain the puzzle concerning why EE firms have rapidly 
internationalized in a short period of time and do not follow the pattern predicted by classical IB 
theories. In comparison with studies from developed country contexts, our findings also highlight that 
the effect of home country support may be context specific. 
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INTRODUCTION  
We extend previous IB research by considering the contingency effects of both home country 
government FDI support policies and the host country environment on the knowledge and capabilities 
required for entry into foreign markets by emerging economy (EE) firms in the specific context of 
China. As latecomers, Chinese firms typically lack intangible resources, such as advanced 
technologies, marketing techniques, established brands, and they have limited knowledge about 
potential host countries, compared to Western counterparts. Yet, Chinese firms often take a large step 
in internationalization by investing in countries which differ institutionally from their home country 
and by seeking knowledge and institutional support to mitigate disadvantages of their late arrival 
(Mathews & Zander, 2007). A growing body of research suggests that Chinese firms engage in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) due to multiple factors that include macro-business environmental 
forces as well as firm-level dynamics (e.g., Lu, Liu & Wang; 2011; Wang, Hong, Kafouros & Boateng, 
2012). This calls for the exploration of multiple factors affecting internationalization by EE firms in 
general and Chinese firms in particular (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu, 2007).   
Early literature on FDI from developed countries largely focused on institutions in MNEs’ host 
countries (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Henisz & Zelner, 2005). In contrast, FDI by firms in EEs, 
such as China, has attracted increasing research interest in the role of home country government 
support in facilitating internationalization (Cui & Jiang, 2012; Luo & Tung, 2007; Wang, Hong, 
Kafouros & Wright, 2012). For EE firms with relatively little internationalization experience, home 
country government support may be critical for facilitating access to resources and enhancing EE 
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firms’ capabilities to take risks in foreign entries (Luo & Tung, 2007). However, the extant IB 
literature seldom considers institutions in both host and home countries simultaneously (Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010; McGahan & Victer, 2010). In particular, the interrelationship between home country 
government strategy with regard to FDI by local firms, host country institutions and prior 
international experience of EE firms has been largely overlooked. We focus upon home country 
government support as a particularly distinctive aspect of the home country institutional context for 
Chinese firms. Considering the interplay between external factors and firms’ international experience 
is especially important for Chinese firms, since home country government support and favorable host 
country institutions may help overcome constraints imposed by the lack of international experience of 
latecomers from China. In other words, the capability implications associated with home government 
support and well-established host country institutions may offset the need to accumulate experiential 
knowledge about host countries. Therefore, we address the following research question: How and to 
what extent do host and home country institutional factors moderate prior international experience in 
influencing foreign entries by Chinese firms into a specific country? Specifically, we examine 
whether home country government support and well-established host country institutions reduce the 
need for previous entry experience in a particular country when undertaking follow-up investment 
projects. To examine this research question we compile a longitudinal dataset drawn from publicly 
listed firms in China during the period of 2002-2009.  
We make several contributions to the IB literature. First, we integrate the knowledge-based view 
(KBV) with the institutional context of the home and host countries by examining interrelationships 
between a host country’s institutional environment, the home government’s policies to promote FDI, 
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and a firm’s previous entry experience in a particular country. We show that home government support 
and well-developed host country institutions enhance organizational capabilities to take risk and 
moderate the need for previous entry experience in the host country by focal firms. This implies that 
the prior knowledge and capabilities required for a foreign entry may be institutionally embedded. 
Specifically, the extent to which prior international experience is important is contingent on the 
institutional context of both home and host countries. This represents an important extension of the 
KBV in the FDI context. 
  Second, we contribute to the identification of boundary conditions concerning the influence of 
institutional contexts for FDI by finding that, for Chinese firms, home country government support not 
only acts as a financial incentive as identified by recent studies (Buckley, Clegg, Cross & Voss, 2010; 
Lu, et al., 2011), but also as an important contingency factor which compensates for EE firms’ 
competitive disadvantages and organizational deficiencies in terms of foreign entries (Luo & Tung, 
2007). This is an important insight given the particular challenges faced by relatively less experienced 
Chinese firms in making FDI entries, and their close relationship with their home government. In 
comparison with studies from developed country contexts, our findings highlight that the effect of 
home country support may be context specific and help to explain the puzzle concerning why some EE 
firms have rapidly internationalized in a short period of time and do not follow the pattern predicted 
by classical IB theories. We go beyond the boundary of the KBV by examining the inter-relationship 
between firms’ prior international experience and contextual forces, such as home country government 
support.  
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Third, we extend recent conceptual and empirical developments that have focused on the home 
country institutional context in showing that EE firms have different motives and different investment 
patterns when they invest in developing countries and developed countries (Wang, Hong, Kafouros & 
Wright, 2012). Specifically, we argue and show that these differences are driven by differential effects 
of home government FDI support policies and host country institutions depending upon whether entry 
is into developed or developing economies. Home government FDI support policies playing a stronger 
substitutive role with regard to prior experience when firms choose to enter developing countries, 
while the quality of host country institutions have a stronger substitution effect when firms choose to 
enter developed countries. This is an important finding suggesting that the moderating roles of macro 
institutions are far from universal but instead are contingent on the level of development of the host 
country.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Knowledge is a multi-dimensional and context-based construct. It broadly consists of tacit and 
codified knowledge as well as organizational capabilities (Grant, 1996; Nonaka, 1994). Tacit 
knowledge is associated with skills, experience and contextual knowledge, whereas codified 
knowledge is less context-specific and can be articulated and relatively easily transferred across 
organizational and national boundaries (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Szulanski, 1996). In addition to 
different types of knowledge, the KBV also highlights the importance of organizational capabilities 
which are a firm’s ability to absorb, integrate and transform internal and external knowledge to create 
competitive advantages (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Grant, 1996; Sirmon, Hitt & Ireland, 2007). 
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Organizational capabilities are not necessarily directly linked to a specific task but are related to the 
ability to cope with complex and uncertain environments in a host country (Lu, Zhou, Bruton & Li, 
2010). Specifically, the KBV of internationalization emphasizes that knowledge about host countries 
informs foreign entry decisions, and organizational capabilities are vital in dealing with risks and 
uncertainties in foreign operations, as well as minimize the resource provisions necessary to buffer the 
adverse effects of “venturing into the unknown” (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; 
Martin & Salomon, 2003).  
While extant literature has emphasized that firms can obtain knowledge about host countries 
through experiential learning (Pedersen & Shaver, 2011), the contingency effects of home country 
government support and host country institutions on experiential learning have been unexplored. This 
aspect is particularly relevant to firms in EEs. For example, although Chinese firms do not possess 
superior knowledge-based endowments compared with traditional MNEs from developed countries, 
appropriate institutional environments or well-established institutions in host countries and 
government support associated with FDI policies in the home country may enhance firm capabilities to 
take risks, thus compensating for the lack of international experience and knowledge about foreign 
markets and enable these firms to accelerate the internationalization process (Buckley, et al., 2010; 
Luo & Tung, 2007).  
There is, therefore, a need to integrate KBV into the institutional context to examine whether the 
interrelationship between institutional factors and prior international experience affects foreign entries 
by Chinese firms. This aspect has been largely neglected in existing studies which often examine 
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either the importance of host country institutions or home country government support or firms’ 
internationalization experience in isolation (Casillas & Moreno-Menéndez, 2013; Eriksson, Johanson, 
Majkgard & Sharma, 1997; Luo, Xue & Han, 2010). Such a research setting largely limits our 
understanding of how firms interact with institutions in both home and host countries in making 
foreign entry decisions.  
This study, therefore, moves beyond existing research by considering the interplay between the 
prior international experience of firms and the institutional context of both home and host countries. 
More specifically, we draw upon the KBV to develop hypotheses which take account of the contexts 
of the home country government’s policies to promote FDI, a host country’s institutions to attract FDI, 
and firms’ prior entry experience. We examine how home government support and host country 
institutional contexts interact with the prior entry experience of the focal firm and examine whether 
institutional contexts enhance risk-taking capabilities, thus reducing the need for firms’ prior entry 
experience. In other words, we consider home country government support and host country 
institutional contexts as important contingency factors and capability enhancing mechanisms that may 
affect the marginal benefits of experiential learning and subsequent decision to invest in a particular 
country (Luo & Tung, 2007). This aspect has been under-explored in previous KBV-grounded models 
of FDI, given that prior research has predominantly focused on the relationships between the 
characteristics of knowledge (tacit or codified), transferability of knowledge and firms’ competitive 
advantages across borders (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003). Therefore, our 
theoretical and empirical analysis helps deepen understanding of how prior international experience 
and contextual factors jointly affect Chinese firms’ location choices and provides new insights into 
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how these forces affect the strategic behavior of Chinese firms in FDI.  
Firms’ Prior Entry Experience and Home Country Government Support  
From the KBV, a firm’s prior entry experience represents firm-specific knowledge that is difficult 
to imitate (Martin & Salomon, 2003; Meyer, Wright & Pruthi, 2009). Such experience allows firms to 
develop organizational capabilities and overcome obstacles to a foreign market entry. Organizational 
capabilities may be derived from managing economies of scale and scope resulting from repeated 
investment (Henisz & Macher, 2004). Prior entry experience also helps firms gain knowledge about 
the host country and build a local knowledge base, and so overcome the liability of foreignness (Peng, 
2001). This local knowledge base includes access to local knowledge through collaborations with 
local firms (Kogut & Zander, 1993) and development of local distribution networks and access to 
local customers (Anand & Delios, 1997). Hence, prior international experience with a host country 
and organizational capabilities associated with foreign operations may encourage firms to select the 
country for further new investments instead of choosing a new country.  
In addition to a local knowledge base, firms’ prior international experience helps reduce the risks 
involved in going abroad and influences managers’ perceived costs of internationalization (Eriksson, 
et al., 1997; Johanson, & Vahlne, 2009). Firms can utilize prior experience of a host country to further 
expand operations in that country to achieve scale economies in production and marketing. 
Subsequent entries into the same host country enable firms to deepen their understanding of a 
business context and improve their organizational capabilities to adapt to local conditions via 
experiential learning (Henisz & Macher, 2004).  
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However, these arguments assume firms gain crucial knowledge about host countries and develop 
organizational capabilities only through incremental and time-consuming learning-by-doing processes 
of conducting business abroad (Casillas & Moreno-Menéndez, 2013; Pedersen & Shaver, 2011). This 
assumption overly emphasizes path dependency and experiential learning, but overlooks the 
contingency impact of home government support on experiential learning in terms of foreign entry. In 
other words, this assumption which focuses on firms’ experiential learning has largely ignored the role 
of home country factors in internationalization (Guler & Guillen, 2010).  
Many developed and developing countries have introduced FDI policies associated with national 
trade and development objectives that provide various benefits to firms that comply with these 
policies (Aharoni & Ramamurti, 2008; Kumar, 2007; Shapiro & Globerman, 2003). The Chinese 
government, for example, regularly issues guidelines that cover countries and industries in which the 
Chinese government supports investments by Chinese firms. Home country government support may 
have a dual moderating impact on the relationship between a firm’s prior FDI experience and 
investment decisions. From the KBV, the home country government can facilitate domestic firms’ 
internationalization by supplying knowledge about foreign countries which can be used by domestic 
firms when venturing abroad. Such knowledge may be contained in official guidance procedures 
based on, for example, knowledge of a particular country collected through diplomatic channels and 
intensive research carried out by government agencies. This is a “supply-side” effect of government 
support in terms of the required experiential knowledge associated with a specific entry decision. 
 More importantly, the home government’s policy requirements and preferences can also affect 
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investing firms’ capabilities to take risk in the context of uncertainty and information asymmetries 
concerning foreign markets. Luo et al. (2010: 74) indicate that “companies complying with 
requirements have preferential treatment concerning funding, tax collection, foreign exchange, 
customs and others”. These authors also state that: “…all investments complying with these 
guidelines enjoy favorable financial support, exchange rates, taxation, and other favorable treatment” 
(76). This resource “shield” may enable companies to buffer the risks and uncertainties associated 
with investing in a specific country/industry included in the state guidance. Since prior international 
experience is used to overcome these risks and uncertainties, state support may reduce its marginal 
benefits, other things being equal. Therefore, complying with state policy may help to enhance 
risk-taking capabilities and reduce the pressure on firms to rely on prior experience to deal with 
uncertainties in international operations, representing a “demand-side” effect on the importance of 
prior learning (Cui & Jiang, 2012). 
The above discussion implies that the knowledge and organizational capabilities required for a 
successful entry may be institutionally embedded, and home country government support may foster 
Chinese MNEs to springboard internationally without having accumulated much international 
experience (Luo & Tung, 2007). When a firm complies with or actively utilizes home country 
government support, including financial and non-financial benefits, its risk-taking capabilities are 
heightened, thus reducing the necessity of prior international experience. As such, home country 
government support may offset the need (i.e., substitute) for a firm’s prior entry experience:  
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Hypothesis 1: A Chinese firm’s compliance with government FDI support policy will reduce the 
importance of its prior international experience in a host country in facilitating an FDI entry. 
Firms’ Prior Entry Experience and Host Country Institutions  
Previous research indicates that host country institutions affect MNEs’ organizational capabilities 
to access external resources and take risk in a host country and, therefore, also affect MNEs’ entry 
decisions (Guler & Guillén, 2010). Host country institutions also affect knowledge access capabilities 
of firms, significantly shaping firms’ market entry strategies (Meyer, et al., 2009). Institutional 
environments that support business development may be a magnet for foreign firms wanting to take 
advantage of favorable conditions (Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh & Eden, 2006). Well-established 
market supporting institutions are able to provide support services to foreign firms and an efficient 
common infrastructure that reduce transactional uncertainty (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999). They also 
help firms reduce search costs associated with accessing critical knowledge for foreign operations 
(Meyer, et al., 2009). 
Despite the importance of host country institutions in facilitating FDI entry, previous studies 
consider prior international experience as crucial for FDI entry (Eriksson, et al., 1997; Johanson & 
Vahlne, 2009). However, well-established market supporting institutions in a host country may 
provide institutional support necessary to attract foreign firms, and such an institutional context 
enables firms to gain sufficient knowledge about the institutional environment in that country. In other 
words, the importance of prior international experience in that particular host country may decline in 
relation to FDI entry when firms operate in a well-established and supportive institutional context. 
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There are two main reasons for this relationship.  
First, firms operating in foreign countries encounter unfamiliarity and discrimination costs 
associated with their foreign operations (Miller & Eden, 2006). Such costs are expected to be low if a 
host country has a well-established institutional environment in which foreign firms can easily follow 
‘the rules of the game’ and gain information necessary for their operations (Schwens & Kabst, 2011). 
Such increased perceived institutional familiarity may reduce reliance on prior international 
experience.  
Second, well-developed institutions may help foreign firms make links with customers, suppliers, 
and local business communities. Again, this increased perceived business familiarity encourages firms 
to make further expansion. A host country with a well-established institutional environment may have 
implemented a set of investment-supporting institutions, such as property rights regulations which 
constrain government expropriation of firms, and contracting institutions which protect firms from 
infringement by private businesses and facilitate market transactions (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). 
Thus, we argue that well-developed institutions in host countries reduce the importance of experiential 
learning as firms face low political risks and uncertainty when operating in such a context. On the 
other hand, under-developed institutions generate hazards of expropriation and transactional 
uncertainty, and so foreign firms have to rely on their prior experience to understand, interpret and 
deal with political and operational risks in foreign locations. This implies that direct experience of a 
host country is no longer seen as a necessary condition for FDI entry when firms operate in a host 
country with well-established institutions.  
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In summary, we posit that although a host country’s institutions do not directly contribute to a 
firm’s knowledge, well developed host country institutions help boost risk-taking capabilities by 
reducing information asymmetry and regulatory ambiguity associated with investment projects. Such 
an institutional context reduces the incremental benefits of experiential learning that is aimed at 
gaining knowledge about how to deal with risks and uncertainties in a specific country. The reduced 
institutional uncertainty may also be associated with a larger reliance on contractual means of dealing 
with risks as opposed to informal, cognitive mechanisms (He, Brouthers & Filatotchev, 2013). These 
two aspects of a host country’s institutional environment may significantly reduce the firm’s reliance 
on prior international experience in this country. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: High quality of host country institutions will reduce the importance of a Chinese 
firm’s prior international experience in a host country in facilitating an FDI entry.  
Developed and Developing Country Contexts 
So far, we have not distinguished whether entry is into developed or developing countries yet 
their influence on entry decisions may be different. Recent studies revealed that EE firms have 
different motives and show different investment patterns when they invest in developing countries and 
developed countries. For example, Wang, et al. (2012) found that government affiliation levels of 
Chinese MNEs have a higher positive impact on these firms’ investment into developed countries than 
into developing countries. EE firms’ capabilities that are shaped by home country institutional context 
are highly relevant to under-developed institutions and may be more easily transferable to other 
developing economy contexts (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008, Luo & Peng, 1999; Wright, Filatotchev, 
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Hoskisson & Peng, 2005). Home governmental support may play a larger role in supporting Chinese 
MNEs to invest in developing countries, where host country institutional environment conditions 
matter less in Chinese MNEs’ FDI decisions since they have already built strong capabilities in 
operating in an institutionally stringent environments and there is therefore a lower knowledge gap. 
For example, the Chinese government has pushed Chinese MNEs to invest in gold mining in Ghana 
and has reportedly been able to exert pressure on the Ghanaian government to allow firms to bypass 
local regulations (UNCTAD, 2007). The underlying reason is that home government support helps 
reduce the uncertainty and operational risks associated with under-developed institutions in these 
countries and hence substitutes for the need to have prior experience in the host country (Luo, et al. 
2010).  
In contrast, EE firms entering developed economies may be seeking to acquire new capabilities 
operating in different institutional environments that can enhance their long term performance 
(Cantwell, 1992; Luo & Tung, 2007). Quality of host country institutions may play a more important 
role in attracting relatively less experienced Chinese MNEs (Guler & Guillén, 2010). In other words, 
Chinese MNEs’ FDI decisions to invest in developed countries may be highly contingent on host 
government policies toward their FDI and well-established market supporting institutions (Schwens & 
Kabst, 2011). Home country government support through direct intervention, i.e. putting pressure on 
developed host countries may have a limited impact on Chinese firms’ entry in these countries (Lin, 
2010). Developed country governments may be cautious, if not suspicious, about the Chinese 
government’s strategic intentions behind the entry (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev & Peng, 2013). For 
example, when the Chinese company Wanxiang Group purchased the bankrupt lithium ion battery 
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maker A123, this raised concerns about sensitive battery technology being acquired that could have 
military applications, although the deal was eventually approved (Bruno & Wiersema, 2013). In 
another example, China’s largest telecommunications equipment company, Huawei, abandoned its 
proposed acquisition of 3Leaf, a U.S. server technology company, following U.S. government 
concerns about Huawei’s connections with Chinese security services (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 
2011).  
In sum, although home government FDI support policy and quality of host country institutions 
will reduce the importance of Chinese firms’ prior international experience in a host country in 
facilitating an FDI entry, we expect home government FDI support policy plays a stronger substitutive 
role when firms choose to enter developing countries, while the quality of host country institutions has 
a stronger substitution effect when firms choose to enter developed countries. Hence, we propose:  
Hypothesis 3a: The substitution effect of a Chinese firm’s compliance with government FDI support 
policy reducing the importance of its prior international experience in a host country (H1) will be 
stronger when Chinese MNEs enter developing countries. 
Hypothesis 3b: The substitution effect of high quality host country institutions reducing the 
importance of a Chinese firm’s prior international experience in a host country (H2) will be stronger 
when Chinese MNEs enter developed countries. 
DATA  
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We constructed a panel dataset of outward FDI by firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock 
Exchanges of China. We start in 2002 because FDI from China surged after China’s access to the 
WTO in 2001 (MOFOM, 2009). To obtain longitudinal data, we focus on firms listed in all eight 
years during 2002-2009.1 We define a subsidiary as any entity where the listed firm holds at least 20 
percent of the equity2. We manually collected information on overseas subsidiaries of listed firms 
from annual reports.3 We identify the establishment of an overseas subsidiary by comparing full 
subsidiary lists of a given firm for consecutive years. If an overseas subsidiary appeared in firm i’s 
annual report of year t but not in that of year t-1, we further check the annual report and other 
documents about the firm for year t to confirm the establishment year for the subsidiary. As shown in 
Table 1, Hong Kong and the Caribbean tax havens (e.g. Bermuda, Virgin Island, and Cayman Island) 
are among the top destinations.  
***Table 1 near here*** 
We compile data on the basic economic characteristics of host countries from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database. We restrict our sample to countries with three basic 
economic characteristics (Population, GDP growth rate, and GDP per capita) available for years 
between 2000 (the earliest year needed to calculate three-year moving average of variables to smooth 
the effects of abnormal fluctuation in economies) and 2008 (the year prior to 2009) from the most 
current version of the WDI. This step drops seven countries which had received investment from the 
sample firms.4  
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We exclude investment projects in Hong Kong, Singapore, Macau, and Caribbean tax havens 
(Bermuda, Virgin Island, and Cayman Island) because outward FDI from China to these destinations 
may be driven by tax considerations (Hampton & Christensen, 2002). We restrain our analyses to a 
sample of subsequent entries which represents the location choices of new entries by 74 firms among 
53 countries in which they had invested in previous years.5 This approach is more consistent with the 
focus of our hypotheses on the interaction effects between a firm’s prior entry experience in a host 
country and the host country’s institutions as well as home country government’s supportive policy 
towards investment in the host country (Chang & Rosenzweig, 2001). Empirically, firms and host 
countries that do not experience any entry over the entire time period under consideration ought to be 
excluded from the choice set because mixing heterogeneous firms (investors and non-investors) and 
host countries (investees and non-investees) risks introducing a serious bias in estimations due to 
unobserved heterogeneity (Martin, Swaminathan, & Tihanyi, 2007). The dataset includes 124 
firm-investment-years, defined as a year in which a given firm made one or more overseas 
investments. Each firm investment year consists of multiple records, with each record representing a 
potential investment choice. The number of records in a firm investment year increases with each 
successive year due to the increasing number of countries following by firms’ initial investments. 
Following the literature, we define developed countries and developing countries according to the 
United Nations’ classification which categorizes countries into developed and developing countries 
reflecting their basic economic conditions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Luo & Wang, 2012). Our 
dataset comprises 5068 observations in the full sample, with 3335 and 1733 observations for investment 
projects in developing and developed countries, respectively. 
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Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable, Entry dummy, equals 1 if a sample firm has conducted a new subsequent 
entry in a given host country in a given year, and 0 otherwise. A firm may have multiple entries in a 
particular country in a single year. In these cases, the dependent variable is coded as 1 no matter how 
many entries a firm had made in a particular country in a single year.  
Independent Variables 
Host country institutions. To operationalize host country institutions that affect the contingency value 
of firms’ prior entry experiences, we choose among well recognized institutional environment 
indicators which are directly related to investment risks of inward FDI. We first adopt the widely used 
Worldwide Governance Indicator (WGI) constructed by Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi (2009). WGI 
is widely used in recent studies on the impact of institutions on firms’ internationalization decisions 
(e.g., Cantwell, Dunning, & Lundan, 2010; Gu & Lu, 2011; Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). Among 
six dimensions of WGI, we use Regulatory quality in our main analyses because it directly captures 
the soundness of policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development, 
including inward FDI (Kaufman, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009). The scores of Regulatory quality range 
between -2.5 to 2.5, with the higher the score, the sounder the policies in host countries related to 
investment, including promotion of inward FDI. In robustness checks, we also use other dimensions 
of WGI and other widely used alternative indicators to proxy the quality of host country institutions. 
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Home country supportive policy. To capture the effect of home country government support on a 
firm’s FDI decision, we construct a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if the industry of a firm’s 
investment accords with the Chinese government guidance for FDI to a given country in a given year, 
and 0 otherwise. Since the implementation of the “go global” strategy in 2000, the Chinese 
government has established the Guidance Catalogue of Countries and Industries for Overseas 
Investment (“Guidance” hereafter) as a set of guidelines for Chinese FDI to help inform firms’ foreign 
entry decisions (Buckley et al., 2010; Luo et al., 2010). The Guidance covers countries and regions in 
which the Chinese government encourages Chinese firms to invest. The Guidance also identifies 
preferred industries in each host country to which the Chinese government encourages FDI by 
Chinese firms. For example, the Chinese government encourages investments in Kuwait, but only in 
oil and natural gas, chemical and cement manufacturing industries. Considering Kuwait as a host 
country, Home country supportive policy equals 1 if a firm’s FDI is in the one of the three industries, and 
0 otherwise. Three versions of the Guidance were issued in 2003, 2005, and 2007, respectively. We 
use the latest version of the Guidance that relates to the entry year. For example, for year 2008, we use 
the Guidance released in 2007 to measure whether a firm’s entry is supported by the government 
policy. 
Prior entries by the focal firm. To proxy a firm’s international experience, we used Prior entries by 
the focal firm which equals the logarithm of the number of prior FDI entries into a particular host 
country by the firm accumulated to year t. The measure captures a firm’s accumulated direct 
investment knowledge in a specific host country which may encourage the firm to further invest in 
that country (Dowell & Killaly, 2009).  
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Control Variables  
Exogenous uncertainty means that some uncertainties, such as political risks, economic uncertainty 
and exchange rate uncertainty, cannot be resolved through the internal efforts of firms (Cuypers & 
Martin, 2010) and should be controlled for in estimation models. We control for exogenous 
uncertainty and market attractiveness of host countries with a set of country-level control variables 
obtained from the WDI. Population, GDP per capita, and GDP growth rate are used as proxies of the 
size, development level, and economic growth in host countries which represents market 
attractiveness of host countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Martin, Salomon & Wu, 2010).  
Previous studies found that various kinds of cross-national distance affect firms’ overseas 
investments (e.g., Berry, Guillen & Zhou, 2010; Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Martin et al., 2010). We 
include cross-national distance measures developed by Berry et al. (2010) to capture their possible 
effects on location choices. Economic distance is defined as differences in economic development and 
macroeconomic characteristics; Connectedness distance is measured as differences in tourism and 
internet usage; Political distance equals differences in political systems; Administrative distance is 
measured as differences in language, religion and legal system; and Geographic distance is calculated 
as the distance between geographic centers of countries.  
Existing literature also found that, in general, countries tend to use bilateral negotiations to 
facilitate FDI (Ramamurti, 2001). Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) play an important role in 
overcoming FDI restrictions. Host countries use BITs to attract inward FDI through upgrading and 
improving quality of investment-related institutions, while home countries use BITs to promote 
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outward FDI by their firms (Dunning, 2009). We measure the existence of BITs between China and 
potential host countries with a dummy variable, Bilateral investment treaty, which equals 1 if a BIT 
was in place in a given year between China and a host country, and 0 other wise.  
We control for three additional sources of international learning experience which enable the focal 
firm to obtain knowledge and to deal with risks in host countries (Henisz & Delios, 2001). First, we 
capture a firm’s experience of exporting to a country with Value of export by the focal firm defined as 
the logarithm of a firm’s exports (in U.S. dollars) to a specific country. We obtain information on 
firms’ exports and destinations from the Customs General Administration of China (CGAC) database. 
The CGAC database covers all trade transactions conducted by Chinese firms. We match listed firms 
and trading firms in the CGAC by firms’ names and registration addresses. This matching method 
follows common practice that links firm-level data with transaction-level trade data (Bernard, Jensen, 
Redding & Schott, 2007). The CGAC database records all export transactions conducted by firms to 
different countries, and we calculate a firm’s exports to a destination which reflects the firm’s 
international experience through exporting (Campa & Guillen, 1999). Second, we control for the 
possibility for a firm to learn from other firms’ exporting behaviors to a country with Value of export 
by other firms, which equals the logarithm of other firms’ export sales to a specific country. Third, we 
include Prior entries by other firms in a country, which is the logarithm of the accumulated number of 
entries in the country by all other Chinese firms excluding the focal firm. This measure captures the 
spillover effect of knowledge about the host country accumulated by Chinese firms. To reflect a more 
representative picture of prior experience by other firms, we use data collected by the Ministry of 
Commerce of China and published in Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
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Investment (MOFCOM, 2009). The latter two measures were used to capture the impact of vicarious 
learning (Guillén, 2003; Salomon & Martin, 2008).  
We also control for Return on assets, Sales, and Firm age because more profitable, larger, and 
older firms typically have more resources for outward FDI (Dowell & Killaly, 2009). We control for 
Government equity share and Foreign equity share, defined as equity shares owned by government 
agencies and foreign investors, respectively. Chinese government support for FDI may differ for 
Chinese firms with different government equity shares. Foreign equity share should be controlled for 
because foreign investors could be an important source of knowledge of global markets. Thus, 
controlling for ownership structure mitigates potential unobserved heterogeneity in estimations.  
Following Holburn & Zelner (2010), we use a three-year moving average window as our main 
regressors, with five exceptions: Prior entry experience of the firm and Prior entry experience of other 
firms are measured with a one year lag because these two variables represent accumulated values over 
all previous years to year t-1. The third exception is Home country supportive policy which measures 
the degree of a potential entry’s compliance with the “Guidance”. As changes in the “Guidance” for 
various years are incremental, a preferred country-industry combination in previous versions of 
“Guidance” is also included in the current guidance, and like prior entry experience variables, we do 
not need to construct the variable as a moving average. The fourth exception is Cultural distance 
because it does not change much over years and is only available for some years in the sample period. 
The fifth variable which is not constructed as a moving average is the Lagged entry dummy, which is 
the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side included to address possible residual serial 
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correlation in robustness checks (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). We restrict our moving average window 
to three years for two reasons. First, for the construction of Value of export by the focal firm and 
Value of export by other firms, we only have access to data starting from year 2000. Second, for a few 
firms that listed in the early years of the sample period, we only have financial information (Return on 
assets, Sales, Government equity share and Foreign equity share) for three years before the listing.  
METHODS  
As the data has a panel structure with temporal dependence among annual observations for a 
given firm, and thus fixed effects models, including conditional fixed effects logit model and 
unconditional fixed effects logit model, are suitable to address these unobserved heterogeneities 
(Denis, Denis, & Yost, 2002). Compared to the conditional fixed effects model, the unconditional 
fixed effects model allows us to keep firm-investment-year groups for which some records have 
missing data and allows us to include interactions containing variables of host/home countries and 
firm experiences (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Katz, 2001). The unconditional fixed effects logit models 
account for unobserved heterogeneity among firms and unobserved temporal shocks because dummy 
variables were included for each firm and each year (Allison, 2009). Therefore, to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity among industries and host countries, we also included a set of industry 
dummies and host country regional dummies.  
To address the possibility of autocorrelation and unobserved heterogeneity of our data, we 
include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side of models (Holburn & Zelner, 2010). To 
avoid specification error, we followed Shamsie, Martin and Miller (2009) and employed an 
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instrument variable for the lagged dependent variable which is calculated by regressing the lagged (t-1) 
dependent variable against all lagged (t-1) independent variables in the models, and then substituting 
the lagged dependent variable with the predicted value (the instrument variable). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics and correlations of the sample of subsequent entries. Most 
host country variables, except Political distance, Administrative distance, and Geographic distance, 
are significantly correlated with the dependent variable. Most firm-level control variables, with the 
exception of Return on assets, Firm age, Government ownership share, and Foreign ownership share, 
are significantly correlated with the dependent variable. All previous internationalization experience 
variables, including other firms and the focal firm, are positively and significantly correlated with the 
dependent variable. Home country supportive policy and host country institutions (Regulation quality) 
are all positively and significantly correlated with the dependent variable.  
***Table 2 near here*** 
We report the estimated coefficients and their standard errors of fixed-effect logit models in 
Table 3. Column 1 in Table 3 contains results for the basic unconditional fixed effect specification 
including an instrument variable of the lagged dependent variable and all independent variables 
except for two interaction terms of main interests. The market attractiveness and distance variables are 
largely insignificant probably because their variances across years are not large enough. The host 
country institution variable (Regulation quality) is positively correlated with the dependent variable, 
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but not statistically significant. Among control variables, Government ownership share has a positive 
and significant coefficient, implying the government plays important roles in Chinese firms’ outward 
FDI decisions. The coefficient of Home country supportive policy is positive and significant, showing 
that alignment with the home country’s supportive policy significantly increases the probability of 
firm entry into a host country. Previous export experience and investment experience in a host country 
by the focal firm and other firms have positive but in significant impacts on the firm’s entry decision. 
***Table 3 near here*** 
Testing H1 and H2 with the full sample, we introduce the hypothesized interaction terms one by 
one in Columns 2-3, and include both hypothesized interaction terms for H1 and H2 in Column 4. 
Columns 5 - 6 of Table 3 represent the results for H3a and H3b using developing countries and 
developed countries subsamples, respectively. Results in Column 2-4 show that both home country 
support policy and host country institutions variables have strongly significant and negative 
moderating effects on the inter-relationship between the firm’s prior entry experience and the 
probability of firm entry into a host country, in line with our theoretical expectations in hypotheses 1 
and 2. The coefficient of the interaction between prior entries by the focal firm and home country 
supportive policy for the subgroup of developing countries (Column 5 of Table 3) is negative and 
statistically significant, while the interaction for the subgroup of developed countries (Column 6 of 
Table 3) is negative but statistically insignificant. The finding is consistent with H3a which predicts a 
substitution effect of a firm’s compliance with home country government FDI support policy. 
However, the coefficients of the interaction between prior entries by the focal firm and host country 
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institution in both subgroups of countries are statistically insignificant. Therefore our results do not 
seem to support to Hypothesis 3b. 
As the coefficients of interactions in nonlinear models do not represent the magnitude of the 
conditional effects (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), we supplement the discussion of the coefficients 
reported in Table 3 with further analysis based on figures constructed using the simulation-based 
approach developed by King, Tomz, and Wittenburg (2000) and Zelner (2009). This approach can 
visually compare the predicted probabilities associated with different combinations of independent 
variable values, and can test whether the difference in predicted probabilities is statistically different 
from zero by constructing a confidence interval. Therefore, it provides a more fine-grained analysis of 
the hypothesized relationships tested in the regression analysis. 
***Figure 1 near here*** 
Figure 1(a) shows how the predicted probability of firms entering into a host country changes in 
association with firms’ prior entry experiences in the host country when the entry is aligned with 
home country supportive policy (indicated by a dashed line) and when the entry is not aligned with 
home country supportive policy (indicated by a solid line). Figures 1(a) also includes the 95 percent 
confidence intervals for the predicted probabilities. Both probability curves were upward sloping and 
the dashed line is less steep than the solid line, suggesting the positive relationship between prior 
entries by the focal firm and the probability of entry is less pronounced when the potential entry is 
aligned with the home country supportive policy, as we expected. As the confidence intervals 
surrounding the predicted probabilities for the dashed and the solid lines overlap in Figure 1(a), it is 
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hard to tell from the figure alone whether the overlap is great enough so that the null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected. Thus, we plotted Figure 1(b) of the difference in predicted probabilities associated 
with increasing prior entries by the focal firm. The dotted symbols and the circled symbols indicate 
that the difference is statistically significantly different from zero at levels of 95 and 90 percent, 
respectively. The downward-sloping curve in Figure 1(b) indicates that the magnitude of the 
difference in probabilities of entries that are aligned with the home country supportive policy and 
those that are not aligned decreases in association with firms’ prior entry experiences. Meanwhile, 
significance symbols indicate that home country support has a significant effect in reducing the 
importance of prior entry experience in entry decisions when a firm has relatively fewer prior entry 
experiences (with 2 or less prior entries), rather than along the whole range of prior entry experiences.  
Figure 1(c) shows how the predicted probability of firms’ entering into a host country changes in 
association with firms’ prior entry experience in the host country with well-developed or 
underdeveloped institutions (measured as one standard deviation above or below the mean of 
Regulation quality, respectively). Again, both probability curves were upward sloping, indicating that 
firms are more likely to enter into a host country in which their previous entry experience is higher. 
Meanwhile, the upward sloping curve when a host country has better-developed institutions (the 
dashed line) is less steep than that when a host country has less-developed institutions (the solid line), 
suggesting the positive relationship between prior entries by the focal firm and the probability of entry 
is less pronounced when a host country has well established institutions, as we expected. Figure 1(d) 
plots the difference between predicted probabilities in Figure 1(c). It shows that although the 
downward sloping curve indicates a negative moderating effect of host country institutions on prior 
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entry experiences, the role of better host country institutions is only significant for firms with a 
modest number of prior entry experiences (3 to 7 prior entries). This result may mean that, in contrast 
to the case when firms have little prior entry experience, better host country institutions have a 
stronger effect in reducing the importance of prior entry experiences when firms become more 
familiar with host country institutions. This is important nuanced evidence related to our H2.  
H3a predicts that the substitution effect of a firm’s compliance with home country government 
FDI support policy on the importance of its prior international experience in a host country will be 
stronger when the firm enters developing countries. Indeed, predicted entry possibilities when a 
potential entry into developing countries is aligned with the home country supportive policy (the 
dashed line) is less steep than that when a potential entry is not aligned (the solid line) in Figure 1(e), 
while the plotted difference between predicted probabilities in Figure 1(f) has a downward trend. 
However, Figure 1(f) also shows that the downward trend is very flat for firms with less than two 
prior entry experiences, but that the downward trend is reversed for firms with more than three prior 
entry experiences. Thus, although the coefficient of the interaction term between prior entries by the 
focal firm and home country supportive policy for the subgroup of developing countries (Column 5 of 
Table 3) is negative and statistically significant, the simulation based figure shows that H3a is 
supported only within a narrower range of values regarding prior entry experiences.  
Finally, Figures 1(g) and 1(h) depict the moderation effect of host country institutions on the 
importance of prior international experience when the firm enters developed countries. In Figure 1(g), 
the upward sloping curve when a host country has better-developed institutions (the dashed line) was 
 30 
 
less steep than that when a host country has less-developed institutions (the solid line), suggesting that 
the positive relationship between prior entries by the focal firm and the probability of entry is less 
pronounced when a host country has well established institutions. In Figure 1(h), the difference 
between predicted probabilities is statistically significant over the whole range of the downward 
sloping curve. The results based on simulation are in line with our predictions in H3b and reveal more 
fine-grained information than the coefficient of the interaction term presented in Column 6 of Table 3.  
Robustness Tests 
To examine the sensitivity of our results to model specifications, we conducted a series of 
robustness tests. First, among the key investment-supporting institutions in host countries are factors 
associated with property rights, which constrain government expropriation of firms, and contracting 
institutions, which protect firms from infringement by private businesses (Acemoglu & Johnson, 
2005). A lack of such fundamental institutions generates hazards of expropriation and imposes 
obstacles to investment by foreign firms. We use two variables to measure expropriation risk and 
political risk faced by inward FDI in host countries. We use the ICRG investment profile, which is 
described as the assessment of investment risk due to contract viability/expropriation and profits 
repatriation to measure the expropriation risk faced by inward FDI in host countries. The ICRG 
investment profile is an index from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) which has been used 
in a number of papers on FDI and institutional environments (e.g., Durnev, Errunza & Molchanov, 
2009; Fogel, 2006), and ranges from 0 (high expropriation risk) to 12 (low expropriation risk). We 
also use the POLCON index, which reflects the extent to which the partisan composition of a 
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country’s formal branches of government (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) constrains any one 
institutional player from unilaterally affecting policy changes (Henisz, 2000). POLCON is among the 
most widely used variables to measure policy risk in countries (Holburn & Zelner, 2010), and ranges 
from 0 (high political risk) to 1 (low political risk). The results of the fixed effect and multilevel logit 
models using ICRG investment profile and POLCON are similar to those in the main analyses.  
Second, we checked the robustness of results using five other dimensions of the WGI separately 
(i.e., Rule of law, Government effectiveness, Control of corruption, Voice and accountability, and 
Political stability) and as a combined factor of six dimensions (these five plus Regulation quality from 
above) obtained after using factor analysis (Gu & Lu, 2011). We also added more control variables 
that may affect a host country’s attractiveness. These variables included Ratio of current account 
balance as percentage of GDP, Ratio of government expenditure to GDP, Ratio of trade to GDP. We 
also controlled for Financial distance, defined as differences in financial sector development, and 
Cultural distance constructed by Berry et al. (2010) using items from the World Values Surveys 
(WVS). Because WVS covers different countries in various years, using moving averages will restrict 
the variable to a few countries. As cultural dimensions do not change as fast as other institutions, we 
used the most recent value of Cultural distance in our analyses. Using alternative measures of host 
country institutions and adding new controls do not change results of the interaction coefficients 
hypotheses.  
Third, as recent studies have shown the importance of supranational regional factors in FDI 
location choices (Flores, Aguilera, Mahdian & Vaaler, 2013), we used Prior entries in the same 
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region by the focal firm to proxy entry experiences accumulated in the same region by a focal firm, 
and use Prior entries in the same region by other firms to proxy entry experiences in the same region 
accumulated by other firms. We used both the geography-based regional grouping scheme based on 
continents and the culture-based regional grouping scheme developed by Ronen & Shenkar (1985) to 
categorize countries into regional groups. Results of regional experiences supported H2 but not other 
hypotheses. The results further confirm that home country supportive policies are country specific, 
and cannot match well with region level experiences. However, institutions in host countries in the 
same region are more or less similar, and thus prior experiences accumulated in the same region are 
more relevant to entry decision in specific countries in the same region.  
Fourth, given our focus on the moderating effect of home country government support and host 
country institutions on the relationship between firms’ prior entry experience and FDI decisions in a 
host country, we use multilevel logit models (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008) as a robustness test to 
supplement our analysis based on the fixed effects logit model The results of multilevel logit models 
are very similar to the results of fixed effect logit models reported above. Because of space constraints 
the results of these robustness tests are not presented but are available upon request.6  
DISCUSSION 
Our study focuses on the interrelationship between the prior international experience of Chinese 
firms, FDI promotion policies of the home country, and the quality of host country institutions, and 
conducts a detailed analysis of how home government support and host country institutions interact 
with prior international experience in foreign entries. We found evidence which suggests that home 
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country government support enhances organizational capabilities to take risks when relatively less 
experienced Chinese firms venture abroad. The quality of host country institutions tends to reduce the 
importance of prior international experience, thus attracting less experienced latecomers, such as 
Chinese firms. Our findings provide partial support for the perspective that home government support 
and host country institutions can offset the need for prior international experience in EE firms’ FDI 
activities. We have examined the importance of home government support and quality of host country 
institutions in the subsamples of developing and developed host countries. The results further reveal 
that home country government support tends to have a stronger substitutive effect on the prior entry 
experience of Chinese firms in developing host countries, whereas the quality of host country 
institutions has a stronger substitutive effect on international experience in developed host countries.  
Our findings indicate that the importance of firms’ prior international experience in FDI entries 
varies, depending on the institutional context of both home and host countries. This implies that 
inexperienced firms can seek home government support and select a host country with favorable 
institutional conditions in international expansion. Thus, internationalization, to a large extent, is no 
longer constrained by knowledge accumulated through conducting business abroad or vicarious 
learning at the firm level. Alternatively, home country government support and well-established host 
country institutions represent important contingency factors which affect the marginal benefits of 
experiential learning and the subsequent investment decisions. Therefore, the effects of prior entry 
experience are far from being universal across different home and host institutional environment, and 
they may be institutionally embedded both at home and abroad. This represents an important 
extension of KBV in the FDI context. 
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Most previous studies based on the KBV were conducted at the firm level and proposed that 
knowledge accumulation, such as prior experience and knowledge acquisition through vicarious 
learning are cornerstones of firm internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009; Kogut & Zander, 
1993; Martin & Salomon, 2003). However, these studies did not take account of the role of 
macro-factors, such as home government support and host country institutions, as important 
contingencies which affect firms’ risk-taking capabilities and the marginal benefits of experiential 
learning. On the other hand, IB research based on various contingency models tended to focus on the 
moderating/mediating roles of firm-level characteristics, such as absorptive capacity or R&D intensity 
(Filatotchev & Piesse, 2009; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Extending the KBV, our research 
complements previous studies by systematically examining the moderating effect of the two 
macro-factors, and it helps bridge the boundary between organizational capabilities and contextual 
forces. This research setting enables us to address the contingency impact of government support and 
host country institutions on prior international experience. Focusing on the inter-relationship between 
government support, host country institutions and prior experience, we go beyond a simplified 
application of KBV to EE MNEs and gain important insights by broadening the KBV beyond the 
boundary of individual firms. In particular, our research suggests that the importance of prior 
experience is contingent on the institutional context of both home and host countries. Thus, the study 
fills an important research gap in the KBV in which institutional contexts or contingency factors are 
visible.  
Further, our more fine-grained analysis based on empirical methodology suggested by King, 
Tomz and Wittenburg (2000) and Zelner (2009) indicates that institutional factors produce their 
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moderating effect not along the whole range of the firm’s prior entry experiences. For example, home 
country support has a stronger effect in reducing the importance of prior entry experience in entry 
decisions when a firm has relatively fewer prior entry experiences. Likewise, host country institutions 
have a significant moderation effect mainly when firms have accumulated a modest number of prior 
entry experiences. This fine-grained analysis indicates that the firm’s prior experience and the two 
institutional factors are not orthogonal, and the experience may define the relative salience of 
institutional effects. For example, better host country institutions have a stronger effect in reducing the 
importance of prior entry experiences mainly when firms become more familiar with host country 
institutions. This finding points to an important avenue of future research which may focus on 
potential inter-dependencies between firm-level knowledge accumulation and the impact of 
macro-institutional factors. 
Our findings contribute to a better understanding of the special characteristics of Chinese MNEs 
with regard to their strategic behavior in terms of foreign entry choices (Mathews & Zander, 2007). 
The results have enabled us to show that home country government support and host country 
institutions help enhance risk-taking capabilities and reduce firms’ reliance on prior international 
experience. These contingency factors may help Chinese firms to engage in internationalization in a 
large step instead of an incremental fashion. Hence, this study enriches our understanding of how EE 
firms internationalize in the distinctive institutional context of both home country and host countries. 
Such analysis also enables us to bring the institutional context more explicitly and appropriately into 
the KBV and enhances our understanding of how firms’ prior international experience is contingent 
on macro factors, jointly shaping the location choices of Chinese MNEs. Our study also fills a gap in 
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the prior literature which separately examines either host country environments or home government 
support or prior international experience. We have obtained new insights in terms of substitutes 
between home country government support, host country institutions and firms’ prior entry 
experiences through focusing on the interrelationship between these factors. Our findings indicate that 
entry decisions are an outcome of a complex interplay of organizational capabilities and institutional 
factors in both home and host countries.  
Our study helps advance IB theory which has either focused on the impact of firm-specific 
advantage on international expansion, but has overlooked or taken the contingency effect of home and 
host institutional contexts in firm internationalization as given, or examined the impact of institutions 
in isolation. Our analysis provides a more complete account of factors affecting FDI entries and shows 
that well-established host country institutions and supportive policies by the home government 
represent capability-enhancing mechanisms through which less experienced firms are able to reduce 
the reliance for experiential knowledge needed for entering a host country. Our findings challenge the 
dominant view about the importance of accumulated experience in conventional internationalization 
theory. The relationship between foreign entries and the impact of firms’ international experience is 
not universal but depends on institutional contexts. Our results also show the importance of 
incorporating both home and host country characteristics in internationalization strategy studies 
(Holburn & Zelner, 2010). These aspects are particularly important for subsequent entries which have 
been largely neglected. More specifically, our findings show that the level of development has a 
significant impact on the salience of the moderating roles of both home government support and host 
country institutions. This is consistent with theoretical arguments put forward in recent work by 
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Hoskisson et al. (2013) who suggest that researchers should focus on macro institutional and 
infrastructure differences between countries. Our findings that the institutional effects differ between 
developed and developing economies point to the need for future research based on more fine-grained 
analysis of the complex interface between firm-level and country-level factors.    
Though based on China, our findings may have implications for practitioners and policymakers 
in EEs. We suggest that governments should continue to develop more fine-grained policies targeted 
at firms with the potential to internationalize but have yet to do so or have done so but only in a 
limited way. Policies may also need to be more fine-grained in terms of the countries and industries 
for which support is offered given the institutional environment of the host country. Further 
consideration should be given to the extent to which bilateral agreements between home and host 
country governments can facilitate a more accommodating host environment (Rangan & Sengul, 
2009). Our findings help managers of MNEs understand the conditions necessary to conduct FDI and 
show that government support is an important contingency factor for newcomers to engage in FDI. 
Hence, managers should carefully assess host and home institutional factors when making entry 
decisions.  
Our results imply that Chinese firms are able to utilize institutional factors to compensate for the 
lack of experience about host countries. This suggests that it may be less important for 
internationalizing Chinese firms to accumulate international experience. Rather, seeking home and 
host country institutional support when making the location choice for foreign entry may be an 
important strategy that helps deal with exogenous and endogenous uncertainty (Cuypers & Martin, 
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2010). For example, information on host countries’ economic climate provided by home country FDI 
promotion agencies may help Chinese firms to assess economic uncertainty and exchange rate 
uncertainty facing them when entering the host country. Knowledge about a host country in terms of 
culture, local norms and values provided by home country government agencies may also assist 
Chinese firms in resolving culture uncertainty when operating in the host country otherwise they 
would have achieved it through a time-consuming learning by doing process. In addition, 
well-established host country institutions will help Chinese firms to understand how local institutions 
work and help reduce local institutional uncertainty. Thus, institutional contexts of both host and 
home countries are more than background conditions and play an important role in the 
internationalization strategies of Chinese firms.  
Although it is important to examine how government policy affects Chinese firms’ 
internationalization strategies, given the increasing importance of the Chinese economy, the 
uniqueness of this form of state support may limit the generalizability of our study. However, we 
know from previous literature that state support may have various forms and different contingency 
impacts, in both developed and emerging economies (e.g., Aharoni & Ramamurti, 2008; Hoskisson et 
al., 2013; Kumar, 2007). Our findings highlight that the effect of state support may be context specific. 
We show that home country state support for sectoral FDI into particular countries is particularly 
valuable for less experienced firms from EEs when making subsequent entries. In contrast, other 
studies in developed countries, such as Canada, examining the direct effect of home country policies 
aimed at inward FDI and outward FDI have shown that while general policies may be indifferent 
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(Globerman & Shapiro, 1999), the effect of sector specific policies varies significantly between 
sectors (Shapiro & Globerman, 2003). 
LIMITATIONS 
As all studies, ours has several limitations that provide opportunities for further research. First, the 
study was restricted to Chinese firms and one dimension of the home country institutional context, 
that is, the Chinese government’s FDI support policy. It should also be noted that China may represent 
an exceptional case in terms of state support since the Chinese OFDI Guidance is rather a unique 
policy mechanism. Nevertheless, focusing on the interrelationship between home government  
support and firm-level characteristics instead of the direct impact of FDI policy on the aggregate level 
of outward FDI (e.g. Globerman & Shapiro, 1999), our study reveals a novel dimension of FDI policy 
and calls for more research on the complex interface between different forms of state support and firm 
characteristics, and how these jointly affect the business strategy of firms from EEs. Additionally, our 
measure of whether the sample firms followed home government guidance was based on subsequent 
investments in policy supported industries in a host country. However, the total number of subsequent 
investment projects is relatively low which leads to a rather low mean for the number of investments 
following home country support policy variable in the overall sample. The total number of 
investments in policy supported industries and countries is rather substantial indicating that the 
Chinese state guidance affects internationalization decisions of companies. Further research could use 
survey data to measure government supportive policies in a more fine-grained way, such as managers’ 
perceptions toward risks associated with outward FDI given specific government support 
 40 
 
Second, our dependent variable is not the performance of foreign subsidiaries but the number of 
new subsidiaries established annually in particular foreign countries. In view of the considerable steer 
given by the Chinese government to FDI location choices, many overseas subsidiaries may be 
established to suit national interests rather than to exploit profitable opportunities. Further research is 
needed to examine the performance of subsequent entries. Third, while we recognize that Chinese 
firms also have opportunities to learn how to deal with institutions in host countries at home, as our 
data is limited to one home country we are unable to capture the effects of learning from operating in 
a home country with weak institutions. A related point is that Chinese firms may also learn from other 
firms’ prior international experience. Though we controlled for the impact of vicarious learning 
(Henisz & Delios, 2001), we were unable to find evidence of the interrelationship between 
institutional factors and vicarious learning. Further research is needed to pursue this important area 
and examine whether Chinese firms have learnt from their counterparts at home and abroad. In 
particular, the channels through which Chinese firms learn from other firms need to be identified 
using both secondary and qualitative data. The other related point is that our research mainly focused 
on the inter-relationship between prior experience, home government support and host country 
institutions, so we did not distinguish the internal process of learning and government-sponsored 
learning. Future research should investigate whether different learning processes or mechanisms have 
differing impacts on foreign entry decisions. Fourth, while our analysis focuses on the establishment 
of a subsidiary in particular countries, we do not have information on the entry mode strategy of the 
sample firms. An entry mode strategy represents an important strategic response to host country 
institutions and home country government support. Further analysis may attempt to explore 
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differences between the modes of foreign market entry and examine how an entry mode strategy 
interacts with contextual forces in both home and host countries. Fifth, we acknowledge that related 
knowledge (from either the home country or another host country) may be leveraged in a new host 
country (Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; Holburn & Zelner, 2010). Further research is needed to 
extend consideration of this knowledge to the issues addressed in this paper. Sixth, we did not 
examine how host countries may use policy or set up regulations to attract or discriminate against FDI 
from EE economies such as China. Further research is needed to take this possibility into account by 
collecting qualitative data through interviewing government officials. Finally, our theoretical approach 
assumed that firms adopt rational, efficiency-centered decision-making. However, FDI decisions may 
be socially constructed and driven by managers’ perceptions of the legitimacy of entering certain 
markets as set down in home government guidance. While this was beyond the scope of our study, 
further research adopting a socially constructed approach may be worthwhile. 
CONCLUSION 
Using a panel dataset of Chinese listed corporations, we have extended previous research on outward 
FDI from an emerging economy by examining the interplay between home government support, host 
country institutions and firms’ prior entry experience on foreign entry decisions by Chinese firms. The 
results indicate that home government support and host country institutions reduce the importance of 
firms’ prior international experience. Our findings provide support for the perspectives that the nature 
of the institutional context can affect knowledge and risk-taking capabilities needed for FDI entries in 
host countries. We extend the boundary of KBV by focusing on the interrelationship between a host 
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country’s institutional environment, the home government’s guidance of FDI and firms’ prior 
international experience. We show that home country government support and well-established host 
country institutions represent capability-enhancing mechanisms that significantly moderate the impact 
of firms’ prior international experience in FDI entries.  
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NOTES 
1 It is possible that a balanced panel which excludes delisted firms during the sample period may 
cause survival bias. However, unlike some other countries (e.g., the U.S.) where delisting is common, 
delisting is very rare in China. During 2002-2012, there were only 75 firms delisted from China’s 
stock exchanges. In a robustness check, we coded outward FDI of firms delisted during the sample 
period and replicated analyses reported in the paper, and found robust results. 
2 Twenty percent of equity is the threshold of disclosure of subsidiaries in annual reports required 
by Chinese authority. Ownership percentages in overseas subsidiaries established during the period of 
2003-2009 range from 23.3% to 100%. We also use 50% and 100% equity as alternative thresholds 
for robustness check, and found the results are robust to the results using 20% as the threshold. 
3 Annual reports are collected from reliable data sources including the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
Stock Exchanges, the China Security Regulation Committee (CSRC), websites of listed firms, and 
database of leading commercial business information providers (e.g., Wind and SinoFin). 
4 These countries include Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Cayman Islands, Republic of Korea, Romania, and British Virgin Islands. 
5 Following the suggestion of a reviewer, we also construct a sample of firms that make 
investment in a given year among countries that had received investment from any firm in the sample 
until the year t. The sample comprises 347 firm-year groups. The results of this robustness test are 
consistent with results for the sample reported in the paper. 
6 Given that the U.S. has received by far the largest number of entries by the sample firms, we 
excluded the U.S. from the sample and found the results to be as robust as those for the full sample 
including the U.S.  
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Table 1: FDI destinations of sampled firms in the period of 2003-2009 
Destination 
Number of 
Entry 
 Destination 
Number 
of Entry 
 Destination 
Number of 
Entry 
Afghanistan 1  Hong Konga 278  Portugal 1 
Antigua & Barbudab 1  Hungary 1  Romania 2 
Argentina 1  India 7  Russia 10 
Australia 19  Indonesia 7  South Africa 3 
Bangladesh 1  Italy 10  Samoa 1 
Belgium 6  Japan 15  Saudi Arabia 1 
Bermudaa,b  4  Kazakhstan 1  Singaporec 26 
Br. Virgin Is.a 58  Korea Rep. 8  Spain 2 
Brazil 3  Laos, PDR 4  Suriname 1 
Bulgaria 1  Liberia 5  Sweden 2 
Canada 10  Luxembourg 4  Switzerlandb, 1 
Cayman Is.a 19  Macaua,b 5  Tadzhikistanb 2 
Congo 1  Malaysia 5  Tanzania 1 
Croatia Rep. 1  Maltab 1  Thailand 4 
Czech Rep. 2  Mexico 2  Turkey 3 
Denmark 1  Mongolia 4  United Arab Emirates 2 
Ecuador 1  Netherlands 25  United Kingdom 13 
Finland 2  Nigeria 3  United States 66 
France 6  Pakistan 1  Venezuela 1 
Germany 14  Panamab 4  Vietnam 8 
Ghana 2  Philippines 4    
Hondurasb 2   Poland 2   Total 702 
Note: “a” represents countries that are treated as tax heavens in robustness checks; “b” represents countries that were not listed as preferred 
host countries for Chinese outward FDI in various versions of Guidance Catalogue of Countries and Industries for Overseas Investment. 
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Table 2: Summary and correlation statistics 
    Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Entry dummy 0.04 0.20 
          
2 Population 17.06 1.65 0.072 
         
3 GDP per capita 8.39 1.61 0.072 -0.111 
        
4 GDP growth rate 4.61 2.61 -0.030 0.079 -0.605 
       
5 Economic distance 5.74 10.06 0.079 -0.263 0.254 -0.040 
      
6 Connectedness distance 3.17 3.11 0.070 -0.226 0.615 -0.340 0.310 
     
7 Political distance 6.11 3.88 0.003 -0.035 0.305 -0.434 0.158 0.332 
    
8 Administrative distance 130.59 57.45 -0.022 -0.179 0.273 -0.117 -0.022 0.315 0.100 
   
9 Geographic distance 7.56 4.09 0.018 -0.089 0.116 -0.198 -0.032 -0.073 0.115 -0.174 
  
10 Bilateral investment treaty 0.73 0.45 0.063 0.186 0.206 0.025 0.146 0.174 0.118 0.033 -0.222 
 
11 Host country institution 0.44 0.95 0.068 -0.192 0.863 -0.610 0.306 0.646 0.278 0.251 -0.071 0.099 
12 Return on assets 0.04 0.08 0.004 -0.003 0.003 -0.033 0.005 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.016 
13 Sales 12.75 1.57 0.034 -0.006 0.019 -0.003 0.017 -0.026 0.016 -0.006 0.016 -0.013 
14 Firm age 15.63 6.02 -0.012 -0.001 0.015 0.023 0.010 -0.018 0.013 -0.003 0.013 0.009 
15 Government ownership share 8.56 13.94 0.023 0.003 0.004 -0.013 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.002 0.005 -0.003 
16 Foreign ownership share 6.48 12.39 0.014 0.001 -0.009 -0.004 -0.007 0.013 -0.010 0.002 -0.008 0.004 
17 Value of export by the focal firm 1.67 4.47 0.077 0.108 0.089 -0.036 0.020 0.043 -0.001 0.001 -0.021 0.053 
18 Value of export by other firms 21.25 2.95 0.081 0.418 0.448 -0.325 0.133 0.234 0.120 0.057 -0.014 0.162 
19 Prior entries by the focal firm 0.06 0.41 0.390 0.030 0.073 -0.036 0.068 0.067 -0.021 -0.022 0.004 0.028 
20 Prior entries by other firms 2.41 4.60 0.144 0.376 0.195 -0.032 0.110 0.096 0.042 -0.085 -0.135 0.485 
21 Home country supportive policy 0.02 0.13 0.270 0.084 0.089 -0.035 0.095 0.079 -0.014 -0.035 0.004 0.072 
 
 
    11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
12 Return on assets 0.004 
         
13 Sales 0.004 0.292 
        
14 Firm age 0.001 -0.009 0.015 
       
15 Government ownership share 0.001 0.072 -0.020 0.150 
      
16 Foreign ownership share -0.001 0.282 0.202 0.053 -0.128 
     
17 Value of export by the focal firm 0.075 0.020 0.181 -0.077 -0.16 -0.03 
    
18 Value of export by other firms 0.403 0.019 0.054 0.016 0.013 -0.026 0.123 
   
19 Prior entries by the focal firm 0.079 0.034 0.104 0.054 0.021 0.069 0.071 0.073 
  
20 Prior entries by other firms 0.127 0.005 0.080 0.061 0.014 -0.041 0.075 0.362 0.131 
 
21 Home country supportive policy 0.090 0.010 0.072 -0.020 -0.007 0.015 0.087 0.103 0.475 0.152 
 
Note: Correlations with absolute value equal or larger than 0.029 are significant at 0.05 level. Home country institution is measured with WGI Regulation quality.
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Table 3: Estimation results of fixed effects logit models 
 
DV: Entry Dummy (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Population 0.284  0.311  0.318  0.361  -0.081  -0.882  
 
(0.276) (0.242) (0.304) (0.256) (0.713) (1.285) 
GDP per capita -0.106  -0.249  -0.205  -0.310  -0.462  3.105  
 
(0.342) (0.391) (0.422) (0.444) (1.197) (2.845) 
GDP growth rate 0.204  0.162  0.160  0.149  1.2720* 0.634  
 
(0.138) (0.126) (0.161) (0.147) (0.527) (0.431) 
Economic distance 0.021  0.028  0.0401+ 0.0395* -0.222  -0.090  
 
(0.020) (0.018) (0.021) (0.020) (0.169) (0.147) 
Connectedness distance 0.041  0.074  0.052  0.076  -0.047  0.849  
 
(0.115) (0.129) (0.124) (0.134) (0.366) (0.614) 
Political distance 0.096  0.058  0.109  0.081  0.087  0.302  
 
(0.082) (0.089) (0.096) (0.096) (0.328) (0.258) 
Administrative distance -0.002  0.000  -0.002  -0.001  -0.043  -0.019  
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.018) 
Geographic distance 0.014  0.030  0.051  0.046  -0.191  0.620  
 
(0.074) (0.073) (0.078) (0.079) (0.296) (0.449) 
Bilateral investment treaty 0.022  0.057  0.043  0.044  0.448  0.097  
 
(0.160) (0.163) (0.171) (0.168) (0.397) (0.233) 
Host country institution 0.543  0.567  1.003  0.949  1.912  -7.518  
 
(0.549) (0.607) (0.662) (0.699) (3.201) (4.767) 
Return on assets -0.534  -0.725  -1.220  -1.138  24.884  -1.481  
 
(2.802) (2.921) (2.781) (2.882) (15.408) (3.036) 
Sales -0.126  -0.175  -0.050  -0.134  -0.896  -0.155  
 
(0.162) (0.169) (0.170) (0.174) (1.169) (0.179) 
Firm age -0.0781+ -0.0823+ -0.0661+ -0.0763+ -0.144  -0.042  
 
(0.041) (0.045) (0.038) (0.045) (0.115) (0.045) 
Government ownership share 0.0323** 0.0340** 0.0336** 0.0345** 0.1622** 0.008  
 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.062) (0.018) 
Foreign ownership share 0.012  0.005  0.010  0.005  -0.4485*** 0.021  
 
(0.019) (0.023) (0.021) (0.024) (0.130) (0.020) 
Value of export by the focal firm 0.0798* 0.0766* 0.0712* 0.0705* 0.5371* 0.028  
 
(0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) (0.273) (0.042) 
Value of export by other firms 0.053  0.015  0.020  0.003  0.223  1.019  
 
(0.174) (0.119) (0.223) (0.163) (0.389) (0.997) 
Prior entries by the focal firm 0.738  1.8127*** 1.5932*** 2.1292*** 9.6458** 1.874  
 
(0.594) (0.515) (0.310) (0.411) (3.046) (1.699) 
Prior entries by other firms 0.002  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.0169+ -0.001  
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.010) (0.004) 
Home country supportive policy 3.4535*** 4.2680*** 3.1220*** 3.8839*** 16.1128** 3.5679*** 
 
(0.736) (0.481) (0.538) (0.481) (5.162) (0.576) 
Lagged DV (Instrument) 0.276  0.151  0.237  0.141  0.3406+ -0.001  
 
(0.174) (0.186) (0.149) (0.174) (0.204) (0.486) 
Prior entries by the focal firm *  
Home country supportive policy  
-0.1224** 
 
-0.0958* -0.7954** -0.069  
  
(0.041) 
 
(0.042) (0.259) (0.048) 
Prior entries by the focal firm *  
Host country institution   
-0.5260*** -0.3097** 1.311  -0.379  
   
(0.151) (0.114) (0.832) (0.762) 
R-squared 0.497  0.534  0.522  0.544  0.781  0.523  
Number of observations 5068 5068 5068 5068 3335 1733 
Note: Columns (1) – (4) are for the full sample; Column (5) is for the developing country sample; Column (6) is for the developed country sample; + p<0.10, * 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Home country institution is measured with WGI Regulation quality.  
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Figure 1: Graphic presentations of the interaction effects in fixed effects logit models. 
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Note: (1a, 1b) represent the interaction effect between Prior entries by the focal firm * Supportive policy in the full sample. 
  (1c, 1d) represent the interaction effect between Prior entries by the focal firm * Host country institution in the full sample. 
  (1e, 1f) represent the interaction effect between Prior entries by the focal firm * Supportive policy in the developing 
countries sample. 
  (1g, 1h) represent the interaction effect between Prior entries by the focal firm * Host country institution in the developed 
countries sample. 
  Home country institution is measured with WGI Regulation quality. 
 
